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Claude Debussy. 
A Grammar of Imagination
l .
We shall be considering here the problem of how meaning 
arises in the instrumental music of Claude Debussy. Let us immediately 
impose upon ourselves a certain restriction: we will not be interested in 
intended meaning, that is, we will pass over all imitative elements, such 
as gusts of wind or rising mists, although it is a singularly rewarding 
subject. I would like, instead, to deliberate the meaning of some of the 
structural features of Debussy’s music, which he himself placed above 
the evocative powers of his musical language -  be it only due to the con­
tinual corrections which he felt obliged to make towards those who de­
fined his music with the epithet pittoresque. Let us remember that in the 
final years of his output, he wrote works which contained increasingly 
fewer allusions to the extra-musical world. These works -  the Etudes, 
En blanc et noir, sonatas -  also cast a peculiar light on his earlier output.
Whilst bypassing programmatic meanings, I would not like to isolate 
Debussy from that which was occurring during his lifetime in other arts. 
On the contrary, this context is of primary significance, as it allows us to 
link musical phenomena with others that are easier to interpret, and via 
this circuitous route to draw closer to an understanding of music. I will, 
however, maintain the same restriction with regard to those other arts: we 
are interested in ‘distant’ meaning, that is, the way in which a work is or­
ganised, and we will pass over ‘near’ meaning, connected with immediate 
content. Another reference point, which will allow me to crystallise my 
ideas, will be Leonard B. Meyer’s theory of musical emotion and meaning.
2.
Since it is difficult for me to treat language, including musical 
language, as something other than a phenomenon conditioned by a more 
primordial, pre-linguistic, more powerful and subtly organised activity of
the mind, in presenting the grammar of Debussy’s music I would like 
immediately to point to its origin in that prelogical world, which for the 
lack of a better term may be called imagination.
In the context of Debussy’s music, the distinction between ‘near’ (sub­
stantial) and ‘distant’ (structural) meaning is not an arbitrary one, as it 
constitutes the key to the whole of modernist art. It sprang from the 
sense of a gap between conventional language and the experienced world. 
More specifically, between the perfect, objective, impersonal logic of 
closed artistic form and actual being-in-the-world, delimited by a tempo­
rally changeable network of references that by their nature are impossi­
ble to grasp. It is easy to show how criticism of the omniscient narrator 
led to the emergence of modernistic literary styles. It is more difficult to 
do in music, as we would first have to establish what was the musical 
equivalent of that narrator. Since there is not the space here to debate 
that thorny issue, let us simply put forward the following thesis: this 
narrator came to prominence in pre-modernistic music -  on the struc­
tural level -  as a ‘hidden’ subjective power organising the formal coher­
ence of the musical work. The absence of such a narrator is manifest in 
music as the disintegration of form. Debussy is a composer in whose mu­
sic this effect is as clear as day.
3.
When presenting the grammar of Debussy’s language, we 
should, therefore, draw attention to those features of his style that lead 
to the tangible loosening of formal ties. The feature which triggers this 
effect most strongly is the principle of contrast. Debussy’s narrative is 
composed of fragments of varying dimensions which are often morpho­
logically unrelated. We will call them here segments. We have the im­
pression that the elementary narrative segments are first scattered, 
separately composed, and then intricately brought together, in the same 
way that a bouquet is composed of flowers which are more or less similar 
to one another. They possess certain spatial features, giving the impres­
sion of lying next to each other. Debussy wrote thus about the process of 
composing his Etudes: ‘The most intricate Japanese engravings are 
child’s play in relation to the graphics of some of my etudes. But it was 
work well done’.1 Let us give an example of such a narrative composed of 
meticulously selected segments:
1 Cit. after Claude Debussy, Etiudy [Études], ed. Bolesław Woytowicz (Kraków, 
1978), 66.
Example 1. ‘Pour les quartes’, bars 1-28 (Études I)
The principle of contrast is complementarily counterbalanced by the 
principle of duplication. In the above example, almost all the segments 
are repeated. This repetition has a number of variants. It may occur at 
once (as is most common) or be separated by another segment. The 
repetition may be exact or inexact. It can occur once (as is most com­
mon) or more times. The repeated segments may be internally uniform 
or contrastive. Contrastive segments are generally derivative. The lis­
tener perceives them as segments of a higher order, that is, consisting 
of two primal segments to which repetition imparts a perceptual iden­
tity as a new tectonic unit. Such compound segments may then be sub­
jected to the process of decomposition into their original components. 
Let us see how the principle of repetition functions in the prelude 
‘Ondine’.
4.
These two grammatical principles -  contrast and repetition -  
are part of the cognitive equipment of our minds, and as such are not spe­
cific to the music of Debussy. What is specific is the way in which he em­
ploys these principles. They do not lead -  as, for example, in classical style
-  to the ordering of the musical material. The repetitions do not serve, 
here, good continuation, but act rather in a static manner, as if they were 
aimed at a clearer tracing of the contour of a given segment. In short, con­
trast and repetition are introduced in order to harness our perceptual ten­
dencies to an experiment in which the anticipated order is unable to crys­
tallise. So what happens then? In Leonard B. Meyer’s opinion:
If the musical patterns are less clear than expected [...] if our expectations are 
continually mistaken or inhibited, then doubt and uncertainty as to the general 
significance, function and outcome of the passage will result. [...] the mind rejects 
and reacts against such uncomfortable states and, if they are more than momentary, 
looks forward to and expects a return to the certainty of regularity and clarity.2
Meyer explains the aptness of such anticipation with a pointed 
statement: ‘the experience of suspense is aesthetically valueless unless it 
is followed by a release which is understandable in the given context’.3 
And what is Debussy’s view on this? Let us quote: ‘What I wanted to do 
was something utterly diffuse, diversified, disconnected, elusive, some­
thing inorganic, and yet in essence organised’.4
These quotations place our problem back within the sphere of the 
modernist revolution, since Meyer’s theory contains the hidden assertion 
that it is only pre-modernist music which takes account of our natural 
perceptual tendencies. And thus, that musical modernism, even as re­
fined as Debussy’s, does not respect the nature of human hearing. With 
Meyer, this assertion has a particular meaning. It should be asked, how­
ever, whether some value is not produced when departing from coherent 
narration. Is this value not comparable to the value of classical form? 
What makes Debussy’s music, in spite of its apparent lack of order, aes­
thetically so exceptionally rich?
This question, as yet unanswered, contains one crucial clue. The 
richness of Debussy’s music proves that musical meaning cannot be re­
duced to emotions. More specifically, to emotions perceived, in Meyer’s 
understanding, as a directional flow of tensions and releases. The mosaic
2 Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago, 1961), 26.
3 Ibid., 28.
4 Cit. after Stefan Jarociński, Debussy a impresjonizm i symbolizm [Debussy and 
impressionism and symbolism] (Kraków, 1966), 127.
of contrasts and repetitions in Debussy bring the listener to a state in 
which those emotions are relegated to the background and extinguished. 
The mind is not led from note to note; it is not drawn to the next phrase. 
Sounds appear as an acoustic, rather than emotional, phenomenon. They 
are not implicated in an aspiration to further solutions, and so the mind 
seems unmoved.
And now for a paradox: being unmoved, the mind is active in a way 
that is not accounted for by Meyer’s theory. In order to understand this, 
we will be well served by a digression on the subject of Ezra Pound -  
a contemporary of Debussy’s.
5.
Let us acquaint ourselves with a short poem from Pound’s col­
lection Lustra (1917).
IN A STATION OF THE METRO
The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
Petals on a wet, black bough.5
As in Debussy’s music, the link between consecutive segments -  im­
ages of faces in a crowd and petals on a branch -  is not clear. And yet out 
of this contrasting, there radiates meaning, which is the result of the jux­
taposition of two images.6 But can this meaning be defined more con­
cretely? With this in mind, let us turn first to Pound’s theoretical writ­
ings. In his opinion, poetry ought to employ precise images: ‘use
5 Ezra Pound, Lustra (New York, 1917), 83.
6 This capturing of the elusive in a net of juxtaposition is a typical procedure of 
modernism. The literary critic Robert Shattuck, seeking ‘to give an idea of how the 
elements of a contemporary work of art form a whole’, writes that ‘the twentieth 
century refers to the art of juxtaposition, whereas formerly the art of transferring 
was dominant’ (Robert Shattuck, The Banquet Years (New York, 1968), 332. Cit. af­
ter Charles Taylor, Źródła podmiotowości. Narodziny tożsamości nowoczesnej, 
trans. Marcin Gruszczyński, Olga Latek, Adam Lipszyc, Agnieszka Michalak, Ag­
nieszka Rostkowska, Marcin Rychter and Łukasz Sommer (Warsaw, 2001), 857 
[Eng. orig. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
1989]). Bolesław Leśmian, in a poem entitled ‘Poeta’ [The poet], from the volume 
Napój cienisty [Shadowy drink], described the creative process thus: ‘I z zachłanną 
radością mąci mu się głowa,/ gdy ujmie niepochwytność w dwa przyległe słowa! / 
A słowa się po niebie włóczą i łajdaczą / 1 udają że znaczą coś więcej, niż znaczą!’ 
[‘And his head reels with avid joy / at expressing the elusive in two adjoining 
words! / And the words roam and carouse / And pretend they mean more than they 
mean!’].
absolutely no word that does not contribute to the presentation’.7 One 
should ‘produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefi­
nite’.8 ‘[...] the proper and perfect symbol is the natural object’.9 (Similar 
sound bites were uttered by Debussy: ‘Let’s purify our music. Let’s try to 
free it from excess baggage. Let’s try to make it more naked’.10 ‘Beauty 
must be visible’).11 This sounds like a manifesto of extremely positivistic 
art. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. For between those calli­
graphic images there should emerge something more -  and it is this 
which is the essence of poetry. ‘[...] the thing that matters in art is a sort 
of energy, something more or less like electricity or radio-activity, a force 
transfusing, welding, and unifying. A force rather like water when it 
spurts up through very bright sand and sets it in swift motion’.12 And 
more: ‘three or four words in exact juxtaposition are capable of radiating 
this energy at a very high potentiality’.13 (Debussy also did not want to 
purify music to deprive it of mystery. Just the opposite: he stated that 
the point of music was ‘the emotional transposing of that which is “in­
visible” in nature’).14
Now let us try to put these poetical images into a more abstract lan­
guage. Above all, let us note that the problem of meaning was treated by 
Pound in a completely asemiotic way, immediately bringing poetry closer 
to music. There is no talk of sign and designatum. Meaning is a special 
act of perception, the condition of which is an expansion of perceptual 
skills. It is a direct experience — a feeling of energy — not subjected to in- 
terpretational processing. The idea is to feel something which is primal 
in respect to the act of interpretation, and which the act of interpretation 
inevitably renders unclear. In this sense, it is even possible to state that 
we are dealing with a procedure that is, in spite of everything, realistic. 
And indeed, Pound gives expression to a specific feeling which occurred 
on his leaving a carriage of the Paris Metro. Except that this is a realism 
that corresponds to a modern sense of reality, which arises where the in­
dividual self emerges from something more voluminous, sub-subjective.
7 Ezra Pound, ‘A Retrospect’, in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ed. Thomas 
Stearns Eliot (New York, 1935), 3-14.
8 Preface in Some Imagist Poets (Boston and New York, 1915).
9 Ezra Pound, A  Retrospect’.
10 Cit. after Stefan Jarociński, Debussy a impresjonizm i symbolizm, 119.
11 Ibid., 119.
12 Ezra Pound, ‘The Serious Artist’, in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ed. Thomas 
Stearns Eliot (New York, 1935), 49.
13 Ezra Pound: Selected Prose 1909-1965, ed. William Cookson (New York, 1973),
34.
14 Cit. after Stefan Jarociński, Debussy a impresjonizm i symbolizm, 118.
This area, inaccessible to traditional logical enquiry, should find expres­
sion in a controlled way in aesthetic experience.
And this is the very purpose served by a form based on contrasts. Its 
essential meaning lies not in the contrasted images themselves -  taken 
separately or together. The meaning is like water moving the sand of 
these images. Water is colourless and shapeless, and so imperceptible to 
the senses (the reference here is always the sense of sight). The presence 
of water is noticeable in that it sets this sand, the object of our percep­
tion, in motion. That which is imperceptible cannot be indicated by the 
substance of art, be it directly or by means of traditional metaphor, since 
the starting point of every metaphor is the ‘ordinary’ sensory world. If we 
wish to point to the ampler meaning of this world, which ripples like wa­
ter breaking up through the bright sand of forms, we cannot transfer the 
features of the sensory world to the sub-sensory domain, as we would be 
once again covering that hidden meaning. In order to reveal that hidden 
shaping force, we have to create the conditions in which it could manifest 
itself in experience without naming it, that is, without identifying it with 
any image. The juxtaposition of images is just such a means: the images 
are drawn to one another by a hidden force, which manifests itself as 
that ampler, uniting motion. This motion by no means negates the sen­
sory world contained in the images, nor does it soften their contrast. It 
brings to the sensory world something more, which completely alters its 
perceived meaning.
Let us read once again:
IN A STATION OF THE METRO
The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
Petals on a wet, black bough.
Now we can return to Debussy’s music.
6.
I asked earlier what value was possessed by the disruption of 
linear musical narrative in Debussy. Now I can answer thus: the gram­
mar that is regulated by the principle of contrast and repetition enables 
the creation of something which Charles Taylor calls ‘a force field which 
can capture a more intensive energy’.15 As in Pound, this force field in­
15 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cam­
bridge, 1989), 475.
clines the imagination to work in a mode other than the registering of the 
linear oscillation of tension and release. The impossibility of synthesising 
sensory data on the surface level of musical shapes need not — as Meyer 
posited -  result in the escaping of energy, that is, the distraction of the 
mind.16 The capturing of a ‘more intense energy’ — more intense than the 
Meyerian energy flow — is possible because music is not so much the pro­
vider of this energy, as its catalyst. And the source of this energy re­
leased by music does not lie on the surface of our perception, in the 
sounds immediately heard. It lies in those layers of the mind which ac­
cumulate beneath the layer of Meyerian emotions. We gain access to 
these layers of awareness thanks to the juxtaposition of segments, which
-  as in Pound -  provoke this more intense energy into activity that mani­
fests itself as the bonding of the elements of a mosaic. It is a concen­
trated, latent energy, set low down, but open upwards to diversity, since 
only such an energy can effect a synthesis of the diffuse surface of 
a work. This energy may be symbolised by the image of colourless water, 
which moves the perceived shapes/segments as it rises to the surface, 
thus making its presence felt. Debussy used the image of wind, but the 
sense is the same as in Pound’s water: ‘Listen to nobody’s counsel, per­
haps only the wind that blows and tells the story of the world’.17 This 
wind is also invisible, and it also manifests itself as a mover of visible 
forms. In Debussy’s opinion, the aim of music is ‘the emotional transpos­
ing of that which is “invisible” in nature’.18 Hence my earlier remark that 
the mind remains unmoved by specific sensory emotions, and at the same 
time active in a way not accounted for by Meyer’s theory -  active like wa­
ter shifting sand or wind blowing leaves.
7.
I am attempting to describe here something which is experi­
enced quite simply, yet is very difficult to put into words. Perhaps the 
whole problem could be explained most succinctly by means of the no­
16 Whilst imagination still discharges here the Kantian function of synthesising 
sensory data, and so theoretically we have not strayed from Leonard B. Meyer’s neo- 
Kantian stance, what has altered is the scope of the action of the senses, and so also 
the sphere of sensory objects. We are entering an area in which that which is sensory 
(subjective) and that which is objective are blurred in a much more radical way than 
in Kant and Meyer.
17 Cit. after Stefan Jarociński, Debussy a impresjonizm i symbolizm, 115.
18 Ibid., 118.
tions of ‘surface’ and ‘depth’. Meyer’s theory (and pre-modernist music) is 
‘superficial’, in the sense that it regards only that which is actually heard 
and the subjective correlative of those sounds -  the dynamic of emotions
-  as aesthetically significant. Yet the theoretical description of Debussy’s 
style requires the acknowledgement of an extra dimension, which may be 
called ‘depth’, understood as the recognition of the fact that the constitu­
tive elements of aesthetic experience go beyond the phenomena of imme­
diate sensory perception, and so their subjective correlative also lies ‘deeper’ 
than emotions -  there, where emotions arise and of which they are the 
form.19 Meyer’s ‘superficial’ aesthetic ideal is entirely Cartesian -  the mind 
ultimately ‘expects a return to the certainty of regularity and clarity’. 
Meanwhile, the whole ‘deep-lying’ aesthetic of Debussy could be derived 
from the sentence that acknowledges the value of that which by nature is 
unclear: ‘I would like music to give the impression that it issues out of shade 
and occasionally returns there; to be almost always someone discreet’.20 This 
same idea is contained in his famous opinion on Pelléas, the ‘most beautiful 
pages of which’, according to the composer, ‘are filled with silence’.
But what is the meaning of this ‘silence’? What does Debussy’s ‘shade’ 
signify? Why should ‘wind’ tell us the story of the world? What is indi­
cated by these terms which all treat something extrasensory and non- 
substantial as a condition for the manifestation of that which is clear and 
distinctive to our perception?
At this point I would like to cite the interesting classification of musi­
cal silence given by Olivier Messiaen in the first part of his Traité de 
rythme, de couleur, et d’ornithologie. He distinguishes three kinds of mu­
sical silence. First he mentions the ‘silence of prolonging’ (silence de pro­
longation), which is a universal phenomenon -  the period of physical si­
lence that follows when a sound fades away. The second is the ‘silence of 
preparation’ (silence de préparation). This could almost be called Mey- 
erian silence. ‘If a repeated passage is suddenly broken off, falls silent 
during its repetition, and is then continued after that momentary sus­
pension, the silence will be filled with the expectation of what is to follow, 
and what we already know thanks to our memory’.21 The third sort of si­
19 Spatial terms are employed here with a metaphoric function: this is a mental 
‘space’, which appears to be ‘boundless’, and about which, generally speaking, nothing 
is known. We usually experience this ‘space’ as centralised and closed within our psy­
che, yet there also occur other experiences, when we sense that our ‘deepened’ 
awareness at some ‘stage’ (in one of a succession of ‘transformations’, on some ‘level’ 
or in some ‘layer’) infinitely transcends our unitary existence.
20 Cit. after George Gourdet, Claude Debussy, trans. Elżbieta Bekierowa 
(Kraków, 1978), 82 [Fr. orig. Paris, 1970].
21 Olivier Messiaen. Traité de rythme, de couleur, et d’ornithologie (Paris, 1994), 48.
lence Messiaen calls ‘empty silence’ (silence vide). This occurs when 
‘a break appears between two phrases and we do not yet know what will 
happen when the silence stops’.22
‘Empty silence’ is closest to Debussy’s silence. And yet the notion of 
silence in Debussy seems fundamentally different. This silence does not 
stand in opposition to sound. It is that shade from which music issues 
and to which it occasionally returns. Silence and sound complement one 
another. More than that, they define one another. They permeate one 
another, as if they were of one substance. This is a sense of silence close 
to that which we find in the Tao-Te-Ching, where we read: ‘Great music 
is soundless’. Or, if we prefer to look for closer references, in Saint John 
of the Cross, who writes in Spiritual Canticle: ‘[My beloved is] The tran­
quil night / at the approaches of the dawn, / The silent music, / The 
murmuring solitude’. And he comments on this stanza thus: ‘This is the 
silent music, because it is knowledge tranquil and calm, without audible 
voice; and thus the sweetness of music and the repose of silence are en­
joyed in it’. The silence of St John is not empty, but ‘songful’. In it re­
sounds ‘the spiritual impression of the majesty of God in Himself and in 
His creatures’.23 Close (even closer, given its non-theological language) to 
the silence of Debussy is Rainer Maria Rilke, who writes in the first Duino 
Elegy about ‘the unbroken message that creates itself from the silence’. 
And elsewhere: ‘Though the living all make the error of drawing too 
sharp a distinction’.24 Thus the silence of which we speak constitutes 
a doubtless universal, albeit rare, human experience.
It would be possible to show in detail how Debussy introduces the di­
mension of silence into his music. It is a wonderful subject, but there is 
not the space here to elaborate on it. For this reason, I shall confine my­
self to enumerating a few technical means that introduce the quality of 
silence into the sound of music. Firstly, there are the breaks, sometimes 
very brief, that occur between successive segments. These breaks are 
sometimes marked in a score with commas, and sometimes even fur­
nished with a fermata, at the end of a segment. This corresponds to the 
colon in Pound’s poem:
The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
Petals on a wet, black bough.
22 Ibid., 49.
23 St John of the Cross, A Spiritual Canticle of the Soul and the Bridegroom Christ, 
trans. David Lewis (Kessinger, 1995).
24 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, trans. Tony Kline (2001). <http://www.tony- 
kline.co.uk/PITBR/German/ Rilke.htm#_Toc509812215> accessed 10 May 2008.
The performance of Debussy’s music requires an excellent feel for this 
nuance, which animates form like that wind recounting the history of the 
world (e.g. at the beginning of the Sonata for flute, viola and harp).
Secondly, we encounter places in Debussy in which a sound complex or 
even a single note is exposed for a longer time. In such instances we have 
the impression of vibration, oscillation, internal resonance; these are phe­
nomena suggesting some silent space, in which the field of this vibration 
can oscillate. We hear this silence now as a natural milieu of the sound.
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Example 3. ‘Les cloches à traver les feuilles’ (Images II)
Thirdly, the presence of silence is sometimes marked by means of a dy­
namic, the use of which results from spatial imagination. How often, in­
stead of subito piano, does Debussy write lointain (from afar). In such cases 
we hear, not so much a difference in the intensity of the sound, as a differ­
ence in its location. Between these places there extends a space of silence.
Fourthly, Debussy’s sound -  above all in his piano works -  often re­
sounds for a long time, even to the very end. In this way, the boundary 
between sound and silence is naturally blurred. One of Debussy’s most 
typical performance markings is laissez vibrer.
laissant vibrer
Très modéré
Example 5. ‘Les collines d’Anacapri’ (Préludes I)
8.
The problem of communication in Debussy possesses a certain 
aspect which goes beyond the scope of traditional semiotic or cognitive 
enquiry. This music opens up for us a space of spiritual experience, 
which can only occur when our perception takes in more than that which 
is positively audible. It is meaning sensed at the moment when our 
minds open themselves up to a purely phenomenological perception of 
sound, relinquishing efforts at interpretation, which in this context con­
stitutes unnecessary ballast. The formal structure -  the grammar of the 
contrasting and repeating of segments — serves this kind of perception. 
This spiritual meaning is wholly subjective (although, if we agree that 
the disintegration of surface formal coherence is a correlative of an in­
sight into the non-substantiality of a subject, it is better to speak of 
a ‘transpersonal’, rather than ‘subjective’, experience. It is possible, how­
ever, that more people could experience it in a similar way. By its very 
nature, a description of this meaning cannot satisfy the traditional rig­
ours of scholarly expression.
Translated by John Comber
